… arrives wrapped in the patriotic packaging of national security, but it is hard to ignore the distinct scent of economic opportunism wafting through. The official pitch is simple: stop China, Russia, and other uninvited guests from sneaking into U.S.-connected infrastructure. The unofficial pitch, less loudly advertised, is that certain American firms will now enjoy a freshly cleared runway to the fattest contracts in global connectivity without having to suffer the indignity of competing with cheaper foreign bids.

Domestically, the cheerleaders are already lined up. American-flagged repair ship operators who were quietly fading into irrelevance are now about to be knighted as strategic assets. Approved equipment suppliers who never quite managed to win on price will suddenly find themselves in the enviable position of winning by default. Even the politicians get their win, they can tell voters they’ve locked the digital front door while quietly steering a steady flow of revenue to well-connected contractors.

… “secure” is the new synonym for “you’re paying more.”

On the losing side, the global cable game just got a lot more expensive for anyone who doesn’t happen to be stamped with the right political approval. Operators who relied on the economies of scale from Chinese gear are now bracing for redesign headaches and price tags that won’t look good in the boardroom. Foreign repair crews who have been keeping international cables alive for decades may now be written off as untrustworthy simply because their passports are the wrong color. And U.S. tech majors who once shopped globally for the best deal are now discovering that “secure” is the new synonym for “you’re paying more.”

Europe’s situation is awkward enough to deserve its own paragraph. Brussels has been busy building a whole resilience cycle, preaching prevention, detection, and collective recovery, yet still working with a diverse supplier base. Now, thanks to Washington’s sudden tightening, EU operators in transatlantic projects may find themselves having to choose between playing by U.S. supplier rules or being left out of the most profitable landing points. Which is a polite way of saying that “coordination” could very quickly start looking like “do it our way or don’t do it at all.” And if you think this is about shared security values rather than Washington setting the commercial terms, I have a bridge, and possibly a cable, to sell you.

All of this is dressed up as resilience building.

But resilience is just the friendly marketing word for control. By making the FCC the bouncer at the undersea club, the U.S. gets to decide not just who comes in, but who gets the VIP tables.

The cables may carry internet traffic, but make no mistake: the real payload here is influence, market capture, and leverage. Everyone’s talking about protecting the backbone of global communications, but the fine print says it’s also about making sure the right people own the spine.